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Why is a single instance, in some cases, suffi- 
cient for a complete induction, whilein others 
myriads of concurring instances, without a 
single exception known or presumed, go 
such a very little way towards establishing 
an universal proposition? 1 
Hume left us with two problems of  induction. The strong problem concerns 
the global justification of  induction: how do we know that the future will be 
like the past? This problem seems to be insoluble, since no a priori justifica- 
tions are forthcoming, and any a posteriori justification would be circular. 
We can do much more with the weak problem, which is to find a set of  rules 
and principles which describe and justify, at least locally, our inductive 
inferential behavior. As Goodman pointed out, we can develop a set of  induc- 
tive principles by paying attention to accepted inductive practice, while at 
the same time adjusting our inferential practice in the fight of  new principles. 2 
The procedure of  mutual adjustment of  principles and practice is more com- 
plex than Goodman indicated, 3 but Goodman's general point, that the des- 
cription and justification of  inductive principles go hand in hand, provides 
a basis for pursuing Hume's weak problem. 
Yet even the weak problem is very difficult. There has been limited 
progress in specifying the principles that describe and justify inductive 
practice. We believe that this is partly because many philosophers concerned 
with induction have assumed that inductive principles would be like deductive 
ones in being formulatable in terms of  the syntactic structure of  the premises 
and conclusions of  inductive inferences. Whereas deductive principles can be 
based solely on file logical form of  the relevant sentences, inductive rules 
must, we shall argue, make essential reference to the content of  the premises 
and conclusion of  the inference. The validity of  inductive inferences depends 
in part on the nature of  the objects and events about which one is reasoning. 
Philosophical Studies 42 (1982) 379-394. 0031-8116/82/0423-0379501.60 
Copyright 9 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A. 
380 P.  T H A G A R D  A N D  R .  E .  N I S B E T T  
Inductive principles therefore are content relative in a way in which deductive 
ones are not. 
We shall illustrate the contention that inductive rules are content relative 
by considering the classic problem that concerned Hume - the confirma- 
tion of generalizations by their instances. Much recent work on inductive 
reasoning has focused on giving a characterization of what it is for a generali- 
zation 'All F are G to be confirmed by an instance, 'Fa and Ga'. 4 As Mill 
noticed, the degree to which an instance confirms a generalization is highly 
variable. Some instances provide nearly decisive confirmation, whereas 
others hardly increase our confidence in a generalization at all. We shall argue 
that the degree to which an instance confirms a generalization depends pri- 
marily on very rich background knowledge about the kinds of entities and 
properties the generalization concerns. Specifically, our confidence in infer- 
ring a generalization 'All F are G' depends on background knowledge about 
how variable F's tend to be with respect to G's. This knowledge is based on 
F being a kind of KI ,  G being a kind of K2, and on the variability of  things 
of  kind K1 with respect to things of kind K2. 
Section I contains experimental, thought-experimental and anecdotal 
evidence for the claim that this sort of background knowledge does in fact 
play a r61e in our inductions. Section II describes more rigorously how varia- 
bility of kinds plays a r61e in confirmation. In III we briefly consider some 
of the philosophical problems concerning natural kinds, causality, and variety 
of instances which our account of confirmation raises. Section IV contrasts 
our account with more familiar models of inductive reasoning. The 
concluding Section V contains brief reflections on confirmation and on the 
methodology of using empirical work on inferential behavior as a guide to 
normative inductive logic. 
Consider the following thought experiment. Imagine you are exploring a 
newly discovered island. You encounter three instances of a new species of 
bird, called the shreeble, and all three observed shreebles are blue. What is 
your degree of confidence that all shreebles are blue? Compare this with your 
reaction to the discovery of three instances of a new metal floridium, all of 
which when heated burn with a blue flame. Are you more or less confident of  
the generalization 'All floridium burns with a blue flame' than you were of 
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the generalization 'All shreebles are blue'? Now consider a third case. All 
three observed shreebles use baobab leaves as nesting material, but how con- 
fident do you feel about the generalization 'All shreebles use baobab leaves as 
nesting material'? 
Most people feel more confident about the floridium generalization than 
about either of  the shreeble generalizations, and more confident about shree- 
bles being blue than about their using baobab leaves as nesting material. 
Nisbett et  al found that undergraduate subjects share such intuitions with 
professional philosophers and psychologists, and in fact often spontaneously 
articulate a version of the justification that we prefer, s 
We know that metals tend to be quite constant with respect to such 
physical properties as flame color and electric conductivity, whereas we know 
that birds are more variable with respect to their color: different sexes of  
the same species can be different colors, and in some kinds such as parrots 
there is wide variation in color. Background knowledge also suggests that 
birds are even more variable with respect to what sort of  materials they use 
for nests. This is why three shreebles' nests are so much less persuasive than 
three fiofidium flames. 
It seems clear that people may differ in their background knowledge in 
such a way as to affect markedly the inductive generalizations they make 
from a given instance. This point has been illustrated in an experiment by 
Quattrone and Jones. 6 They found that subjects were more prone to make 
generalizations about members of an out-group than about members of an in- 
group. For example, Rurgers students were more likely to generalize about 
the behavior of Princeton students on the basis of the behavior of one 
Princeton student than were Princeton students, while Princeton students 
were more likely to generalize about Rutgers students after observing one 
Rutgers student than were Rutgers students. Quattrone and Jones conjecture 
that the reason for the discrepancy is the assumption by the in-group that 
members of the out-group are less variable in their properties than members 
of the in-group. 
One implication of the Quattrone and Jones study is that the difference in 
people's beliefs about variability may be a function of the degree of their 
experience with events of the kind in question. For kinds of events that are 
characterized by high variability, the novice and the expert may thus make 
quite different generalizations. Nisbett et  al. (op. cit.) found that people 
with a good deal of  athletic experience were less willing to assume that a 
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superb performance at a football try-out was indicative of generally superb 
abilities than were people who had less athletic experience. Similarly, people 
with acting experience were less willing to assume that a superb performance 
at an audition was indicative of generally superb acting abilities than were 
people who had no acting experience. Apparently the experienced subjects 
were more aware that a single instance of football playing, or of acting, may 
~ail to reflect the individual's general level of ability. 
The history of science provides examples of cases where a very limited 
number of instances proved to be decisive. We believe that these are well 
understood in terms of background knowledge about variability. For example, 
Einstein's general theory of relativity implied that light could be deflected by 
an intense gravitational field. Eddington's celebrated experiment during the 
1919 eclipse set out to test the generalization that light is so deflected by 
considering whether starlight is bent by the sun. Only a few photographs 
sufficed to convince most scientists that light was indeed bent by a gravita- 
tional field. 7 Background knowledge tells us not to expect much variability 
in the behavior of light, so a few instances suffice. We do not crucially need 
to consider other eclipses, other light sources, other gravitational fields, or 
other mountain tops. Light is not the kind of thing for which these factors 
would matter. Compare the situation in social science, where variability is 
so great and we are so lacking in a coherent account of inductively reliable 
kinds of people and behavior, that we must constantly be wary of spurious 
correlations with no causal significance. 
The above examples indicate that background knowledge about variability 
in kinds is important for confirmation theory. The importance has been lar- 
gely unnoticed in recent philosophical work, which has followed Hempel in 
trying to give a general account of what it is for an instance to confirm a 
generalization, or Carnap in trying the build a formal model for quantitative 
confirmation. 8 Previous, less formalinductive logicians including Mill, Keynes, 
Russell, and Harrod noticed the relevance of background knowledge about 
variability and kinds but did not develop the insight. 9 We need a more 
rigorous and general account of how background knowledge about variability 
affects the degree to which a generalization can be confirmed by its instances. 
II  
That 'All floridium burns with a blue flame' is highly confirmed by a few in- 
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stances is due to the fact that metals are highly invariant with respect to 
physical properties such as combustion. That 'All shreebles use baobab leaves 
as nesting material' is poorly confirmed by a few instances is due to the fact 
that birds are more variable with respect to the kinds of nesting materials 
they use. To make this precise, we need a formalism which enables us to 
compare the degree of variability in different kinds of things. Then we can 
make the claim that degree of confirmation is a function of degree of in- 
variance.l~ 
Let H be the hypothesis "(x)(Fx D Gx)', and let E be the evidence 'Fa and 
Ga'. Suppose F ' s  are a kind of K1 and G's are a kind of K2; for example, 
shreebles are a kind of bird, and blue is a kind of color. Then if C(H, E) is 
the degree to which H is confirmed by E, and I(Ka, K2) is the invariance of 
K~ with respect to K2, our basic claim can be represented: 
C(H, E) = f(I(K,, K2)). 
The claim needs to be fleshed out in two ways, by further characterizing 
the function f ,  and by indicating how the metric I(K1, K2) is to be calcu- 
lated. Confirmation is a function of more than just variability of kinds: full 
determination of C(H, E) may require reference to other sorts of back- 
ground information in addition to what we discuss, and of course degree of 
confirmation is partly a function of number of instances. But we maintain 
that how rapidly degree of confirmation increases with number of instances 
depends primarily on variability of  kinds. Degree of confirmation is presuma- 
bly a monotonic, negatively accelerated function of number of  instances, 
but the rate of  acceleration depends primarily on considerations of variability. 
With high I(K1, K2), degree of confirmation increases very rapidly with only 
a few instances; but if invariance is low, degree of confirmation will increase 
only slowly as instances mount up. 
How can we measure I(K1, K2)? In the metal case, estimation of I(Kx, 
K2) is based on our background knowledge that metals tend to be invariant 
with respect to physical properties like combustion and conductivity. This 
knowledge in turn is based on experience with many kinds of metals. We 
know that whatever particular physical pioperty a few instances of  the metal 
have, the other instances of  that kind of metal will probably have it too. I f  
one instance of aluminum conducts electricity, probably they all do. If  one 
instance fails to take on a magnetic charge, probably they all do, given 
standard conditions. With birds, however, we can think of kinds which 
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Fig. 1. Conf'trmafion as a function of  sample size and I ( K 1 ,  K 2 ). 
assume different colors and use different sorts of nesting material. There is a 
greater degree of association between kinds of metal and combustion proper- 
ties than there is between kinds of birds and either colors or kinds of nesting 
material. 
Various measures of association between classifications have been discus- 
sed by statisticians. Different measures are appropriate for different cir- 
cumstances, but one particularly useful measure, discussed by Goodman and 
Kruskal, 11 is based on optimal prediction: degree of association of two clas- 
sifications into kinds is a function of how well knowing that something is of  
a kind from the first classification will enable you to predict its kind in the 
second classification, compared to how well you would predict without 
using the classifications. If  kinds in the second classification are associated 
with high probability with specific kinds from the first classification, then 
knowing the classification will greatly improve prediction. For the formal 
details, see Goodman, and Kruskal. It can easily be verified that their measure 
of association between classification can be adapted to provide a measure 
of  degree of invariance between kinds, I(KI, K2). In ordinary life, we 
do not have as part of  our background knowledge a measure of invariance 
as precise as that calculated by Goodman and Kruskal, but their measure 
could be viewed as an ideal approximation to assessments of  invariance such 
as people make in the metal and bird cases. 
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In assessing the degree of confirmation of (x)(Fx D Gx), it is of course 
essential to consider the relevant kinds, K~ and K2. Normatively, selecting 
the relevant kind is analogous to the problem of selecting the appropriate 
reference class for a single object or event. To get an estimate of the 
probability that Fred will have a heart attack, we need to place him in the 
class such that subdivision is statistically irrelevant. 12 Similarly, we need to 
select a reference class for the class of shreebles; this is the broadest kind such 
that considering subkinds to which shreebles belong does not give a different 
estimate of  variability with respect to color. The more one knows about a 
subject, the more relevant do subkinds become. Perhaps we should consider 
shreebles as a kind of waterfowl, or as a kind of Australian waterfowl, if 
these subdivisions give us a different judgment of variability from merely 
considering shreebles as a kind of bird. Placing shreebles in the most homoge- 
neous class can make an enormous difference in the inferrability of generali- 
zations. If  our reference class is vertebrates, we have too much variability 
to be able to generalize usefully about color. We are reduced essentially 
to simple enumeration. At the other extreme, knowledge of the appropriate 
reference class can mean that a single case is "sufficient for a complete 
induction". Thus normally our inference making will be enormously more 
furthered by finding a narrower, more homogeneous reference class than by 
collecting more instances of shreebles, la 
I I I  
Philosophers accustomed to the syntactic austerity of  Hempelian confirm- 
ation theory may find the above use of the notion of kind ontologically pro- 
fligate. What are kinds, and how can we legitimately use such a vague notion 
in inductive logic? In responding to these questions, it should be noted at the 
outset that we already know from Goodman's grue problem and other 
paradoxes that a purely syntactic account of confirmation is impossible. 
Some background knowledge must be brought in, if only to select predicates 
which are projectible in Goodman's sense. The above discussion indicates 
that we also need knowledge about kinds, and we shall now try to show that 
the notion of kind possesses some psychological and philosophical respect- 
ability. 
Much recent work in cognitive science concerns how human knowledge is 
organized with respect to kinds and categories. In cognitive psychology, the 
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organization of objects into categories is considered to be critical to deter- 
mining how humans store and process information. 14 Similarly, a standard 
technique in artificial intelligence is the organization of concepts into A- 
KIND-OF hierarchical networks, is Thus it is entirely plausible that people do 
naturally employ the organization in terms of kinds which our account of 
confirmation presupposes. 
The notion of a kind is also philosophically important. There is more 
to saying that a robin is a kind of bird than just saying that all robins are 
birds. Simply to write (x) (Rx ~ Bx) would not bring out the information 
needed to run the model of confirmation described in Section II. As Quine 
points out in an important essay on natural kinds, kinds can be seen as sets, 
but not all sets are kinds. Quine claims that humans have an "innate similarity 
sense" which provides us with the initial ability to organize the world into 
kinds. However, natural selection has also endowed man with the ability to 
transcend this initial organization: 
He has risen above it by developing modified systems of kinds, hence modified similarity 
standards for scientific purposes. By the trial-and-error process of theorizing he has 
regrouped things into new kinds which prove to lend themselves to many inductions 
better than the old.16 
Systems of theoretical kinds can be built up through inductive experience. 
Our model of  confirmation makes use of such systems. Through past expe- 
rience, we know a great deal about different kinds of metals and kinds of  
birds, and such knowledge cannot be neglected when analyzing degree of 
confirmation. 
Quine describes important connections between the notion of a kind 
and more philosophically familiar notions of  subjunctive conditionals: we can 
say that if x were a robin, it would be a bird. Kinds also are relevant to 
understanding singular causal statements: "To say that one event caused 
another is to say that the two events are of kinds between which there is 
invariable succession". ~7 Mere sets will not suffice, since the two events might 
fall into any number of trivial sets which accidently overlap. 
Talk of causality raises an important question for the account of confirm- 
ation we have given. We have described degree of confirmation in terms of 
background knowledge concerning kinds and variability. To what extent is 
this background knowledge causal? Certainly, we presume there are causal 
explanations of why metals behave as they do and why birds have the colors 
they do. If  we were actually in possession of good causal explanations for 
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these phenomena, our confidence in the degree to which we generalize from a 
given number of instances might increase. But we do not need this informa- 
tion in order to make inductive inferences. Although it is assumed that there 
is some causal underpinning to the classification into kinds, we do not need 
to know the full causal story in order to use the information about kinds and 
variability to assess degree of confirmation. 
Much remains to be said about the philosophical and psychological bases 
for considering organization into kinds as a fundamental part of our under- 
standing of the world, but we shall pursue that task no further here. The 
point of our discussion has been to show that the importance of the notion of 
a kind goes far beyond its r61e in our account of degree of confirmation. 
IV 
In this section we shall relate our discussion to several more general accounts 
of inductive reasoning- theory choice construed as inference to the best 
explanation, Hempel's qualitative confirmation theory, and Bayesian probab- 
ilistic confirmation theory. 
Thagard has used case studies from the history of science to develop 
an account of scientific theory choice as selection of the best of competing 
explanations of the evidence. 18 This account departed from standard hypo- 
thetico-deductive accounts of theory confirmation by using a non-syntactic, 
highly contextual measure of explanatory power, taken from William Whe- 
well. 19 Briefly, one theory is more consilient than another if it explains more 
classes of facts. The notion of a class of facts is highly pragmatic, depending 
on the organization of scientific knowledge at a given time. For example, 
refraction and reflection - the basic laws of each - constitute two classes of 
facts which optical theories must explain. Consilience is most relevant to 
assessing the explanatory power of theories, but it also has an application to 
generalizations. A generalization (x) (Fx ~ Gx) is consilient if there is variety 
among the objects a such that Fa in conjunction with the generalization 
explains Ga. It is not the number of instances which matters so much as their 
variety. 
That conclusion can be understood in terms of the account of confirm- 
ation given above. How do we assess "variety among instances"? Such an 
assessment requires background knowledge about the kinds of things in- 
volved. To test, for example, Snell's law of refraction, we would measure 
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different substances at different temperatures, and so on, but not worry 
about such matters as the particular city where the results were achieved: the 
light and its media are not the kinds of  things which are variable with respect 
to geographical location. When background knowledge tells us that F is o f  a 
kind KI which is variable with respect to K~, of  which G is a kind, then we 
know we need to find a variety of  instances before we can infer that (x) (Fx 
D Gx). Invariance based on background knowledge licenses not only restric- 
tions to fewer instances, but also less concern about variety of  instances. It is 
therefore background knowledge about the variability of  kinds which enables 
us to assess the consilience o f  a generalization and infer it as the best explana- 
tion. 
Variability in kinds is a consideration which goes beyond Hempel's syntac- 
tic account of  confirmation,2~ but is of  some help in understanding a well- 
known paradox in that account. It  is a consequence of  Hempel's conditions 
on confirmation that, because 'All F are G' is logically equivalent to 'All 
non-G are non-F ,  the first generalization is confirmed by anything which is 
non-G and non-F. Thus we get the paradoxical result that an instance of  a 
white shoe confirms 'All ravens are black'. One popular resolution of  the 
paradox is to grant that 'All ravens are black' is confirmed by a white shoe, 
but to point out that this confirmation is much less than that gained by an 
instance of  a black ravenY The reason for the difference in degree of  con- 
firmation is that there are far more non-black things than ravens. Our model 
suggests that there is more to the difference in degree of  confirmation than 
just the different numbers of  ravens and non-black things. Our background 
knowledge tells us that ravens are kinds of  birds, and black is a kind of  color, 
and that birds are fairly invariant with respect to color. However, we have 
no analogous background knowledge about non-black things and non-ravens. 
'Non-black' and 'non-raven' are not  kinds of  anything. With those properties, 
we are relegated to doing the kind of  induction by simple enumeration which 
requires us to gather very many instances before we can have any confidence 
that we have more than an accidental correlation. In contrast, 'raven' and 
'black' fit into our knowledge system in such a way that we can use informa- 
tion about variability of  kinds to establish a high degree of  confirmation on 
the basis of  relatively few instances. This, in addition to size of  the relevant 
classes, allows us to judge that 'All ravens are black' is much better confirmed 
by a black raven than 'All non-black things are non-ravens' is confirmed by a 
white shoe. 
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In probabilistic confirmation theory, C(H, E) is generally identified with 
P(HIE)-P(H). 22 The more a piece of evidence raises the probability of  a 
hypothesis, the more it is said to confirm the hypothesis. P(H I E) is general- 
ly calculated by means of Bayes' Theorem, a simple form of which is: 
P(H [ E) = P(H) • P(E I H) / P(E). 
There are numerous problems with Bayesian, probabilistic confirmation 
theory which we shall not attempt to review here. 23 But a discussion of our 
claims concerning the importance of variability to confirmation would not 
be complete without relating it to the Bayesian tradition. 
At the top level, our variability model fits very well with probabilistic 
confirmation theory. Three instances of blue-burning floridium increase the 
probability of the relevant generalization more than three instances of blue 
shreebles increase the probability of 'All shreebles are blue', in some sense 
of probability. Hence degree of confirmation is greater in the former case. 
We might expect also that the background knowledge about what kinds of  
things are involved could play a direct r61e through Bayes' theorem, but the 
simple Bayesian model does not seem rich enough to bring out the relevant 
reasoning. 
Three instances of blue-burning floridium give us a high probability for 
'All fioridium burns with a blue flame', but why? This is not due to high 
prior probability P(H), because until we get the first instance of floridium, 
P(H) would seem to be low, if we could sensibly give it a value at all. More- 
over, high P(H) cannot be the main contributor to high P(H I E), since then 
P(H[ E)-P(H) and hence C(H, E) would not be high. In addition, there 
seems to be no difference between the relevant values of P(E [ H) and P(E) 
in the floridium and shreeble cases. Hence the Bayesian approach, narrowly 
construed, does not seem adequate to account for the variability effect. 
A Bayesian could say that use of background information about variability 
is really deductive, and therefore need not be taken into account in a model 
of  inductive reasoning. We might for example have the principle that any 
combustion property of a metal will be completely invariant. Letting 'MF' 
stands for 'F  is a kind of metal' and "CG' stand for 'G is a kind of combustion 
property'  we could write the generalization: 
(x)(y)(F)(G) [(Mr & CG & Fx & Gx & Fy) D Gy]. 
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This implies that once you have one instance of something which is both F 
and G, it follows deductively that the next F will be G. More generally, we 
can assume the presence in our background knowledge of information of the 
form: 
(x)(y)(F)(G) {P[Gy [ (K~ F & K2 G & Fx & Gx &Fy) ]  = n) 
Using this information, we could deductively get from a single instance 'Fa & Ga' 
a high value for P(Gb I Fb) and hence for P((x)(Fx ~ Gx)) and P(H tE). 
Thus, it could be argued, the difference between the floridium and shreeble 
cases is that the former case gives a much higher value for n. Undoubtedly, 
some such construction could be made, but it does not go far in illuminating 
the logic of  variability and confirmation. Perhaps the metal case is deductive, 
but the two shreeble cases, one involving color and the other nesting 
behavior, are clearly more complex. One instance would not generate a stable 
value for P(Gx): getting extra cases does matter when confirming the genera- 
lizations that all shreebles are blue and that all shreebles use baobab leaves 
for nesting materials, and the important result to hang on to is that the extra 
case matters in different amounts to the two generalizations. Hence, we need 
the general relation C(H,E)=f(I(Ka, K2). So the e.xistence of  deductive 
relations is not enough to enable the Bayesian to take variability into account. 
Mary Hesse has made a Bayesian proposal for accounting for the import- 
ance of variety of  instances, which, we saw earlier in this section, is correlative 
to the problem of variability. It is indeed a problem for the Bayesian to explain 
why variety of  evidence is inductively important. Hesse proposes that the concer n 
for variety of instances is a corollary of eliminative induction.~ Suppose S = 
(HI, 1-12 .... H n } is a set of finite, exhaustive, and mutually exclusive hypoth- 
eses. Then P(H1 t E) + P(Hz I E) + ... P(H,, I E) = 1, and any disconfirmation 
of any proper subset of  S by new evidence increases the sum of the probabil- 
ities of  the remaining subset. Variety of  instances is then seen to be desirable, 
since greater variety will presumably lead to disconfirmation of more of the 
Hi, leaving the remaining ones better confirmed. 
In the shreeble case, this might work as follows. Thinking deterministically, 
our alternative hypotheses, prior to any evidence, might be: 
HI  All shreebles are blue. 
/ / 2  All shreebles are green. 
. . .  
Hn All shreebles are brown. 
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Then if P ( H  1 V a 2 V ... n n )  = 1, the observation of even one blue shreeble 
will eliminate all alternative hypotheses and establish that P(H1 t E) = 1. 
Reference to variability and kinds would be unnecessary. 
However, we have to consider the possibility that shreebles will vary in 
color. This possibility requires us to add: 
Hn+l Shreebles come in various colors. 
Then the observation of a blue shreeble will still rule out 112 ... Hn, but we 
would have only the result: P(Hl VHn+l IE) = 1. If  P(Hn+I) , the prior 
probability that shreebles vary in color, is very high, then the probability that 
shreebles are blue will not be greatly increased by the evidence. Conversely, 
if shreebles are highly invariant with respect to color, then the probability 
0 f i l l  is greatly elevated. In order to get an objective estimate o fP(Hn§  
need a method for assessing invariance along the lines suggested above in 
Section II. 
We do not doubt that our concerns about the relevance of variability to 
confirmation could be incorporated into some more elaborate Bayesian 
account of inductive inference. Our point has not been that there is any 
incompatibility between Bayesian inference to generalizations as we construe 
it, but rather that any confirmation theory including Bayesian will have to 
take into account the effects of  variability on degree of confirmation. 
v 
Our account of confirmation illustrates our contention that inductive 
principles are content relative. Assessment of degree of confirmation must go 
beyond syntactic matters to consider the kinds of things under investigation. 
Further illustration of this principle could be found in the logic of theory 
choice, where the criteria for selecting the theory which provides the best 
explanation of the evidence are content relative, and in the logic of statis- 
tical analysis of data, where appropriateness of a particular statistical test 
in an empirical context depends on background assumptions about the 
nature of  the relevant population. 
In discussing the validity of deductive reasoning, we can abstract from the 
content of the sentences in question, since deductive validity is a function 
only of logical form. Even here, however, abstraction from content is un- 
realistic at the practical level. Since no finite reasoner has the time or resour- 
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ces to infer all the consequences of his or her behefs, what actually gets 
inferred when must be a function of more than just what legitimately may 
be inferred by logical rules. The content of what we believe and the nature of 
our general concerns will determine what inferences are selected from the 
infmite number we could make. 
In inductive reasoning, even which inferences we may make is in part a 
function of the content of our beliefs. Content can play a rble in different 
ways. It affects what rules it will be appropriate to use. The rules for accepting 
theories, for adopting generalizations as well confirmed, and for accepting 
or rejecting statistical hypotheses, apply in different contexts. One needs 
to know what one is talking about in order to select the appropriate rules 
for the context. In addition, as our discussion of degree of confirmation 
showed, content affects how much evidence is needed before an inference 
becomes legitimate. Hence the validity of our inductive inferences depends 
on beliefs about the nature of the events in questionY 
Since Camap, most work on inductive logic has been highly analytical and 
mathematical, emphasizing syntactic constructions or Bayesian formalisms. 
In company with Goldman's approach to epistemology, 26 we recommend a 
more empirical approach to inductive logic. The inductive logician can take 
as data experimental results such as we described in Section I, or case studies 
from the history of science, or even the more informal anecdotal evidence 
that is usually all that logicians have considered. The empirical approach 
obviates distractions which arise from artificial constructs such as 'grue'. 27 
Inductive logic is primarily concerned with how people actually do reason. 
Of course, there is no simple move from how people do reason to how people 
shouM reason, which is the concern of the normative discipline of inductive 
logic. But empirical results and reflection on them can contribute greatly to 
the development of normative models. 28 Empirical studies help us to identify 
pervasive features of human reasoning, and sound normative models must 
either account for those features, or explain why those features are not 
desirable parts of a normative model. We hope to have shown in this paper 
that any satisfactory normative model of confirmation must take into 
account the r61e of background knowledge concerning kinds and variability. 
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